realized. 5 However, also during this period many Republican Justices staunchly opposed gender equality, and far more remains to be accomplished.
Since Justice Scalia's death, the Supreme Court has been deadlocked on a number of Constitutional questions. Accordingly, his replacement on the Supreme Court, dictated by the 2016 presidential election, will have a dramatic effect on the interpretation of the Constitution, including a number of issues relating to gender equality.
President Barack Obama nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Merrick Garland to replace Justice Scalia on the Court, but Senate Republicans, fearing loss of control of the Court for perhaps both political 6 and economic reasons, 7 refused to consider Judge Garland's 7. A lot of money is also riding on control of the Supreme Court, in terms of the interpretation of federal banking, antitrust, and environmental laws, as well as laws governing arbitration claims, class action suits, and punitive damage awards. For example, in one single pro-business decision, the Supreme Court reduced a punitive damages award against Exxon for the Exxon Valdez disaster from $2.5 billion to $507 million -an amount that exceeds the amount of money spent by the candidates in a presidential election. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2003) . See also James B. Stewart, Republicans Have a Stake in Making a Deal on a Supreme Court Justice, NEW YORK TIMES (March 3, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/business/a-way-to-a-deal-on-a-supremecourt-nomination.html. Stewart quotes Professor Lee Epstein:
And when it comes to business and economic issues, what's at stake is nearly every probusiness Supreme Court ruling since the Reagan era and the emergence of a reliable 5-to-4 pro-business majority on the court. 'To see the number of cases that could change with this appointee is stunning,' since so many of the most important cases were decided by 5-to-4 votes, said Lee Epstein, who teaches constitutional law and legal institutions at Washington University in St. Louis. See generally Victora Bassetti, Behind the Merrick Garland Blockade, Brennan Center for Justice (May 5, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/behind-merrick-garland-blockade. Bassetti candidacy or to even hold hearings on his nomination. Newly-elected President Donald Trump has nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Neil Gorsuch to fill Scalia's position on the Court.
B. The Swing Justice and the Author of the Majority Opinion
Since 2006, the "swing justice" on the Supreme Court has been Justice Anthony Kennedy. 8 If a conservative justice like Judge Gorsuch is appointed to replace Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy will remain the swing justice. If a liberal justice is somehow appointed to that vacancy, the new swing justice will be Justice Stephen Breyer, the most conservative member of the liberal wing of the Court. 9 If President Trump is given the opportunity to fill more than one vacancy on the Supreme Court, the balance will tip even further; the swing justice might be Chief Justice Roberts for the conservatives 10 or Justice Elena Kagan for the liberals.
11
Even in cases where changing the ideological balance of the Supreme Court would have no effect on the outcome of a case, it could have a dramatic effect on the Court's reasoning, because it might change which justice would author the majority opinion.
12 For example, in the marriage equality cases, if the vote had been 6-3 instead of 5-4, the author of the opinion might have been Ruth Bader Ginsburg instead of Anthony Kennedy, and the Court might have recognized sexual orientation as a suspect classification and declared that laws that intentionally disadvantage this group are subject to heightened scrutiny.
C. The Constitutional Provisions Affected
The most fundamental constitutional bulwark protecting gender equality is the Equal Protection Clause, and there are many Supreme Court decisions on gender discrimination from this Republican era of 1970 forward that are ripe for overruling. However, the constitutional law of gender equality is not limited to questions involving the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Many other provisions of the Constitution also play a critical role in the determination of gender equality, including the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the right to Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment; the Right to Privacy, which is one aspect of the right to "liberty" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Congress' power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause, the General Welfare Clause, and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the State Action doctrine; and the unenumerated principle of "state sovereignty", which is derived from the 11 th Amendment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is also divided on questions of statutory interpretation that relate to gender equality. This paper discusses the impact that Justice Scalia's replacement will have on these aspects of constitutional law and statutory interpretation that relate to gender equality.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION

A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has recognized Equal Protection claims based on gender discrimination for forty-five years, but the standard of review employed by the Court during that period to evaluate such claims has wavered from rational basis to strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny to a strong form of intermediate scrutiny. At first, in Reed v. Reed the Court employed a low level of review, the rational basis test. 13 Three years later in Frontiero v. Richardson a plurality of the Court adopted strict scrutiny 13 . See Reed, 404 U.S. at 761 (stating that the issue in the case was " whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced" by the Idaho statute).
as the proper standard of review. 14 19 The addition of a liberal justice to the Court would install a majority who support the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard for laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, while the addition of two more conservative members of the Court would probably spell its demise.
B. Intent to Discriminate
One of the great, yet almost invisible, constitutional principles is the doctrine of "governmental intent." 20 Governmental intent is a theme that 14. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (stating, "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny" (footnotes omitted)).
15. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
16. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (ordering that women be admitted to the Virginia Military Institute on the same basis as men, and stating, "Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that action.").
17. See id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking a "tradition" approach to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause). Justice Scalia commenced his opinion by equating coeducation with the closure: " T oday the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half."
18. See id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) ("While terms like "important governmental objective" and " substantially related" are hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than does the phrase " exceedingly persuasive justification.").
19. (2000) ("The role of intent in law may seem quite arcane but, in fact, it has had a shattering effect on large areas of law and once again it reflects the substitution of a conservative pervades Constitutional Law. In several other areas of Constitutional Law the government's intent determines the standard of review that the law is subject to. For example, in freedom of expression cases, the Supreme Court has stated that "The government's purpose is the controlling consideration" 21 in determining whether the law is content neutral, content based, or viewpoint based.
22
In Equal Protection cases, the doctrine of governmental intent is known as the requirement of "purposeful discrimination," and it has an even greater significance than in other areas of constitutional law. No matter how great of a disproportionate impact that a law has upon a particular group, if the law was not adopted for the purpose of having that effect upon that particular group, then the members of that group have no valid claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause against that law.
23
The most egregious example illustrating the principle of discriminatory intent in gender equality cases is Geduldig v. Aiello. 24 In that 1974 case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a California state disability insurance program that did not cover disabilities resulting from complications of pregnancy. 25 The Court found that the law did not discriminate between women and men, but rather it discriminated between "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 26 Refusing to treat this as a case of gender discrimination, 27 the Court upheld the law on the ground that it would save money, which is of course a legitimate governmental purpose. 28 proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."). See also Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 57 ("In the speech and racial areas, . . . the conservatives have used the intent standard to substitute conservative notions of morality for an instrumental standard, which would have judged actions by their often predicable result.").
24. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (upholding state disability insurance program excluding coverage for disability resulting from normal pregnancy).
25. See id. at 489 (quoting the statutory provision excluding coverage for "any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.").
26. Another extreme case decided during the Republican era involving the application of the requirement of discriminatory intent is Personnel Administrator v. Feeney. 30 In that case, the Court ruled that a state law granting an employment preference to veterans did not purposefully discriminate against women, even though 98% of the veterans at time were men, and the law had the effect of virtually locking women out of eligibility for civil service positions in the State of Massachusetts. 31 In Feeney, as in Aeillo, everybody knew that the law would have a devastating effect on women, but women were prohibited from challenging the law under Equal Protection because they could not prove that lawmakers had a conscious intent to discriminate against them; they could not prove that the law was adopted for the purpose of imposing a burden upon them.
32
Another recent example of the Court's blindness to the gender impact of its decisions is its ruling in Harris v. Quinn (2014), 33 which overruled decades-old precedent in striking down fair share fees for a public union of home health care workers, and with it the viability of those workers to unionize. As Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein state in their essay Reducing In sum, childbearing is not only a biological function unique to women. It is also inextricably intertwined with employers' " stereotypical views about women's commitment to work and their value as employees." Because pregnancy discrimination is inevitably sex discrimination, and because discrimination against women is tightly interwoven with society's beliefs about pregnancy and motherhood, I would hold that Aiello was egregiously wrong to declare that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex. (citation omitted) 30. Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 281(1979) (upholding Massachusetts law granting absolute preference to veterans in civil service appointments).
31. See id. at 271 n. 21 (" In 1972, women still constituted less than 2% of the enlisted strength."); Id. at 265 (stating that Feeney "eventually concluded that further competition for civil service positions of interest to veterans would be futile.").
32. See id. at 279. T he court stated: " Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Yet, nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service. 33. Harris v. Quinn, 134 U.S. 2618, 2644 (2014) (striking down state law requiring home health aides to pay fair-share fees to union that represented them in collective bargaining).
Labor to Love, "Harris v. Quinn shows as little respect for history as it does for women's work." 34 The reality, of course, is that there is a deeply entrenched unconscious bias that accepts double standards and fosters indifference to gender discrimination. In Aiello, the California legislature was indifferent to the impact of denying disability benefits to women who suffered complications from pregnancy, and in Feeney, the Massachusetts legislature was indifferent to the gender implications of granting an absolute preference to veterans in civil service employment. In both cases, the Supreme Court was indifferent to the evident and predictable disproportionate impact of these laws. The entire concept of "discriminatory intent" must be reexamined to account for unconscious bias. A liberal majority would certainly be more receptive to this argument.
C. The "Real Differences" Test
In his concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency v. New York, Justice Robert Jackson proposed an insightful standard for equal protection cases: the "real differences" test. 35 Jackson suggested that the law may not treat groups of people differently unless there are "real differences" between them and other persons. 36 Furthermore, to justify disparate treatment under the law, those differences must be "fairly related to the object of the legislation." 37 During the modern Republican era, the Supreme Court repeatedly misapplied the "real differences" test in gender discrimination cases. For example, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court ruled that it was constitutional for the law to require men but not women to register for the draft because women were not legally eligible for combat, 38 pregnancy and only women can become pregnant. 39 There is of course, no valid reason for the law to exempt women from the military draft. Nor is there a valid reason to hold them immune from prosecution for statutory rape. In Rostker, the difference between men and women -eligibility for combat -was not a "real difference", but rather one that was imposed by federal statute and military regulation. 40 In Michael M., the difference between men and women -the possibility of pregnancy -was not "fairly related to the object of the legislation," which was to protect children from sexual contact. 41 Is it not remarkable that the same Court -with almost the same set of justices -could decide both Rostker and Feeney, Michael M. and Aeillo? In Rostker the Court was supremely aware that women were not eligible for combat, but that awareness disappeared in Feeney when veterans were awarded an absolute preference for government jobs. And in Michael M. the Court determined that the case turned on the fact that only women can become pregnant, but that signal fact was of no significance in Aiello.
A more liberal court will overrule both Rostker and Michael M., and will rightfully acknowledge that the real differences between men and women are only seldom "fairly related" to the purposes of the law.
III. LGBTQ RIGHTS
A. Marriage Equality
The Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are statutory. Under 10 U.S.C. § 6015, "women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions," and under 10 U.S.C. § 8549 female members of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." T he Army and Marine Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of established policy. Congress specifically recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from combat in exempting women from registration. (citations omitted) 41. See Michael M., supra note 39, at 471-472. T he Court stated: We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional and psychological consequences of sexual activity. T he statute at issue here protects women from sexual intercourse at an age when those consequences are particularly severe. (footnote omitted) 42. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696 (striking down provision of federal Defense of Marriage Act
Obergefell v. Hodges 43 were each rendered by a 5-4 majority. 44 The addition of two conservative justices would reverse those results. On the other hand, as noted above, the addition of a liberal justice might expand the reasoning of the Court. In Windsor and Obergefell, Justice Kennedy struck down the restrictive marriage laws on the ground that they failed to serve any legitimate governmental interest. 45 In neither of the marriage cases does Justice Kennedy discuss whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification, or whether legislation directed against gays and lesbians is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to heightened scrutiny.
46
B. Sexual Freedom Lawrence v. Texas
47 was authored by Justice Kennedy. In striking down a Texas law that made same-sex intercourse a crime, he reasoned that the law infringed upon the liberty rights of gays and lesbians.
48 Unlike Justice Kennedy, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence Justice Sandra Day O'Connor based her decision on Equal Protection, finding that it was unconstitutional for the law to permit opposite sex couples to engage in oral and anal sex but to punish same-sex couples for the same behavior. 49 However, Justice O'Conner, like Justice Kennedy in his later opinions in Windsor and Obergefell, declined to conduct a "suspect class" analysis; instead she reasoned that moral disapproval, without more, is an illegitimate basis for discriminating against a discrete group of people.
50
As in the marriage cases, the addition of a single liberal justice might enable the Court to find that gays and lesbians are a suspect class deserving of heightened judicial protection from hostile legislation.
prohibiting the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages).
43. Justice Scalia famously dissented in Lawrence 51 and never retreated from his position that the government may make homosexuality a crime.
52
With the addition of two conservative justices the Supreme Court might adopt his position, overrule Lawrence, and authorize the states to once again criminalize same-sex intercourse.
C. Distortion of the Political Process
In Romer v. Evans, 53 the Supreme Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that purported to strip the power from state and local governments to adopt laws that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 54 The Court reasoned that it was unconstitutional for the government to make it more difficult for one group of people to obtain the passage of protection from acts of discrimination than it is for other groups. 55 In the wake of the Supreme Court decisions recognizing marriage equality, a number of states have enacted or proposed laws that would similarly prohibit governmental units from outlawing discrimination against gays, lesbians, and transgender persons. 56 60 Justice Kennedy voted with the four liberal justices to strike down the "admitting privileges" and "surgical center requirements" provisions of the Texas TRAP law. 61 As with so many other constitutional issues, the replacement of Justice Scalia with a conservative justice would simply preserve the status quo. The addition of two conservative justices would likely be sufficient to overturn Roe v. Wade and all of the attendant rights. The addition of a liberal justice would likely result in expanded protection of the right to an abortion, principally because the Court might replace the "undue burden" test with "strict scrutiny."
Normally when a law "infringes" or "affects" a constitutional right, the Supreme Court presumes that the law is unconstitutional and applies strict scrutiny to determine its constitutionality. 62 But when a law restricts a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, the Supreme Court evaluates its constitutionality by asking whether the law imposes an "undue burden" on the woman's right. 63 In applying the "undue burden" test, the Court has not presumed that the law is unconstitutional as it does with strict 58 In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. 'Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,' T he law must be shown 'necessary, and not merely rationally related to, the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.' (citation omitted). 63. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S., at 874 (stating, "Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
scrutiny. Instead, in effect, the persons challenging the law in effect bear the burden of proving that the law "unduly" inhibits a woman's rights. The undue burden standard has been used to uphold numerous restrictions on the right to an abortion, including laws banning government funding of abortions, 64 prohibiting abortion advice or referrals, 65 imposing waiting periods, 66 mandating patients to be subjected to "counseling" against abortions, 67 and requiring parental consent.
68
Moreover the modern Republican Supreme Court has at times been reluctant to protect women from acts of private interference with reproductive freedom. While the Court has acknowledged that laws preserving access to clinics are "content neutral,"
69 the Court has, as often as not, struck down these laws because they were not "narrowly tailored" enough. 70 73 In his dissenting opinion in Hill, Justice Kennedy fired a shot across the bow, stating:
The Court now strikes at the heart of the reasoned, careful balance I had believed was the basis for the opinion in Casey. *** So committed is the Court to its course that it denies these protesters, in the face of what they consider to be one of life's gravest moral crises, even the opportunity to try to offer a fellow citizen a little pamphlet, a 
B. Contraception
The entire modern understanding of the Right to Privacy may be at stake in this election. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Alito has never acknowledged the correctness of Griswold v. Connecticut or the central principle of the Right to Privacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court framed the Right to Privacy in these terms:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Our precedents "have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 81 If a majority of like-minded conservative justices were appointed to the Supreme Court, they might reject the principle that the American people have a constitutional right to make intimate and personal choices regarding "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education" and opt instead for the "specific tradition" test favored by Justice Scalia; and they might find that the right to use contraception is not "deeply rooted in the nation's tradition" and therefore not a constitutional right.
V. THE VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION OF "RELIGIOUS LIBERTY" LEGISLATION
A. Federal RFRA
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 82 the Supreme Court construed the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act as invalidatin g a provision of the Affordable Care Act requiring employer-funded health insurance to cover all FDA-approved forms of birth control. 83 In a decision of "startling breadth," 84 the majority of the Court expanded the concept of "religious liberty" beyond all previous bounds. Echoing its ruling in Citizens United that recognized the right of corporations to participate in the political process, 85 in Hobby Lobby the Court for the first time declared that for-profit corporations have the capacity and the right " so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," and therefore cannot be deprived without compelling justification," quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
80. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct., at 2717 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating, "What Windsor and the United States seek . . . is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right.").
81. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 fn. 6 (Scalia, J.) (writing for three members of the Court and contending that fundamental rights must be based upon " specific traditions" " continuing to the present day").
82. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2777 (2014). 83. See id. 84. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, "In a decision of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.").
85. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, (2010) (ruling that corporations have a constitutional right to spend money to support candidates for public office; id. at 354 (stating, " By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.").
to exercise religion. 86 In an even more extreme and unprecedented ruling, for the first time in its history the Supreme Court declared that in exercising religion, one person has the right to deprive another person of their legal rights.
87
Justice Ginsburg's powerful dissent in Hobby Lobby rejects these and the other constitutional innovations of Justice Alito's majority opinion.
88
With the addition of one additional liberal justice, her dissenting opinion will become the majority.
B. State RFRA's
In the wake of the Court's rulings in Windsor and Obergefell, several states have enacted or considered enacting legislation permitting discrimination against LGBTQ individuals and couples. For example, Mississippi H.B. 1523 authorizes both private persons and government employees to act upon three specific religious beliefs involving gender, marriage, and sexual conduct, 89 while North Carolina H.B. 2 mandates discrimination against transgender persons. Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes, which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. In evaluating the constitutionality of these and similar laws, the Court must not only revisit its ruling in Hobby Lobby and determine the level of scrutiny these laws deserve under Equal Protection, but the Court will also have to revisit its recent interpretations of the Establishment Clause and the State Action Doctrine. Does the government have an obligation under the Constitution to remain neutral in religious matters? Is the government prohibited from encouraging acts of discrimination?
For example, Mississippi H.B. 1523 authorizes persons to refuse service to others based upon their beliefs that marriage is limited to a man and a woman and that sex should be confined to marriage. 91 In Barber v. Bryant, 92 the district court ruled that this law violates the Establishment Clause because it violates the principle that the government must remain neutral in matters of religion. 93 However, in 2014 in Greece v. Galloway, 94 the Supreme Court abandoned the notion that the government is prohibited from endorsing religion, and noticeably failed to mention the longstanding principle that government must be neutral towards religion. 95 Will the Supreme Court affirm the district court's decision in Barber or will it hold that the government may endorse specific religious beliefs, not only by permitting religious displays and official prayers, but by permitting persons to discriminate on the basis of those beliefs?
Similarly, North Carolina H.B. 2 prohibits individuals from using any bathroom in a public facility except for bathrooms designated for use by that person's biological sex at birth. 96 In other words, a transgender person must use a public bathroom for the sex they were born with, not the sex they have become. Amendment. 105 In that case, the Court ruled that while Congress may enact laws protecting civil rights, it may not go too far; instead, those protective laws must be "congruent with" and "proportionate to" the Court's interpretation of people's rights under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106 A more liberal court would probably reject the "congruence and proportionality" standard of Boerne v. Flores, as Justice Ginsburg recently suggested in her dissent in Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals. 107 In that case, the Court might then return to the salutary doctrine that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact laws that it has a rational basis for believing are "necessary and proper" for the protection of civil rights. 108 
B. Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to enact laws regulating interstate commerce, and under the Affectation Doctrine, the Commerce Clause has long been interpreted to mean that Congress has the power to enact laws regulating economic activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
109
Many of this nation's most significant civil rights laws have been adopted and upheld pursuant to this power. 110 In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed Congress' power under the Commerce Clause by adopting a constricted understanding of what constitutes "economic activity." 111 The Court has struck down laws regulating conduct that unambiguously has a substantial effect on interstate commerce on the ground that the conduct being regulated did not constitute "economic activity." 112 A more liberal court would reject this constricted approach, and would, of course, reject Justice Thomas's proposal to overrule the Affectation Doctrine in its entirety.
113
C. The State Sovereignty Doctrine Less than twenty years ago, the Supreme Court revived the longdiscredited doctrine of "state sovereignty," 114 a concept that was a foundation principle of the Articles of Confederation, 115 but which was prominently omitted from the Constitution of the United States, which ordained and established "a more perfect union." 116 In Shelby County v. Holder 117 this unenumerated principle of "state sovereignty" was invoked to invalidate a key enforcement provision of the Voting Rights Act, 118 and in Coleman v. Maryland it was used to strike down a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act. 119 Justice Ginsburg dissented in Shelby County and Coleman, and she made clear in those cases that the principle of "state sovereignty" may not be used to overcome the will of the people, as represented in Congress, in the adoption of civil rights legislation. 120 With the addition of one additional liberal justice, her position will become the law of the land.
VII. INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
A. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Judicial respect for the legislative branch requires that if a statute is ambiguous, and one interpretation of the statute would be constitutional and the other interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, then the court is bound to adopt the interpretation that is constitutional so that it may uphold the legislative act. 121 The modern Republican Supreme Court takes the canon of "constitutional avoidance" one step further. The conservative court has chosen to narrowly interpret civil rights laws such as Title VII and the Voting Rights Act in order to avoid deciding whether those provisions are constitutional. 122 Essentially, if the Court harbors a constricted understanding of a congressional power or a constitutional right, it will translate that understanding into a narrow construction of civil rights statutes. A liberal majority with a broader understanding of congressional power and individual rights would be less likely to find that civil rights statutes were going too far in protecting the rights of individuals.
B. The Use of Legislative History
Justice Scalia abhorred legislative history, and refused to consider legislative reports or debates in construing the meaning of legislation. 123 This left Justice Scalia free to interpret the words of a statute unencumbered by evidence of what its authors meant to accomplish. 124 Similarly, when Justice Alito interpreted the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in Hobby Lobby, he did obvious violence to the clear bipartisan purpose of Congress to "restore" the pre-Smith meaning and effect of the Free Exercise Clause. 125 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissenting opinion in Shelby County, "The Court makes no genuine attempt to engage with the massive legislative record that Congress assembled."
126 Additional conservative justices are likely to follow the lead of Justices Scalia and Alito, while a liberal justice is likely to give due regard to the importance of legislative history in statutory interpretation, and to be more faithful to congressional intent.
C. Using Bad Constitutional Law to Interpret Statutes Badly
In his dissenting opinion in Young v. United Parcel Service, 128. Id. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking Aiello for the proposition that the language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act serves merely a clarifying function).
LGBTQ and straight individuals. The Supreme Court is evenly and sharply divided in its approach to interpreting all of these constitutional provisions, and these interpretive differences also affect the validity and application of civil rights statutes. The recent presidential election will have a major impact on our legal rights to gender equality.
